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Do political parties make a difference is one of the biggest questions in social 
sciences and the extent to which parties do or do not make a difference has 
enormous implications for our appreciation of the democratic nature of our 
polities. Unsurprisingly, many studies have sought to estimate the extent to 
which political parties impact on policy outputs. Do the policy outputs of social 
democratic governments differ from the outputs of conservative governments?! 
To what extent does the ideological make up of the government determine the 
nature of government decision making in terms of measures taken? This is a 
huge question and the present chapter seeks to make a contribution to the 
ongoing debate. The chapter focuses on a single policy area (child care policy) 
and a single country (Spain). I ask: to what extent did the change in 1996 from 
socialist government to conservative government impact on child care policy 
outputs? Did the change in ideological disposition of the government make any 
difference on this policy matter? The chapter is organized as follows. First, I 
elaborate the main debates in studies of gender and politics and of political 
economy on the topic of 'do parties make a difference on policy matters?' The 
debate can be fairly crudely summarized using the following hypotheses 1 and 
2: llYes, parties do make a difference and 2INo, parties do not make a 
difference. Second, I justify the selection of the empirical case study and 
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present the sources for research. Third, I describe the main central state child 
care policies in the post 1975 period in Spain. Drawing on analyses of statistics 
and policy documents, I argue that there are basic continuities in actual policy 
making in the area of child care regardless of the party in office. This appears 
to support, in a small (and with qualifications) but not insignificant way, 
hypothesis number 2. Fourth, I provide an interpretation of why child care 
policy outputs were not affected by the change of government from socialists 
to conservatives. 
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
Research on gender equality policy making in Western countries has argued 
that generally speaking conservative parties facilitate the elaboration of gender 
equality policies to a significantly lower extent than social democratic parties 
(Bashevkin, 1998; Beckwith, 1987; Gelb, 1989; Katzenstein, 1987; Lovenduski 
& Norris, 1993; Lovenduski, Norris & Bums, 1994; Mazur, 1995; among 
others). This is so at least for six reasons. First, feminist activism has been more 
intense within socialist parties than conservative parties. Social democratic 
parties have traditionally been much more concerned with class inequalities 
than with gender differences. Nevertheless, feminist leaders and activists of 
socialist parties have often succeeded in adding clauses involving women's 
issues to their party platforms. Feminists from social democratic parties have 
also become policy makers. In their role of state officials, these socialist 
feminists have advocated and contributed to the establishment of policies to 
advance the status of women. 
Second, female politicians (more often than male politicians) at times try to 
direct the attention of the political class to issues that may interest women more 
than men such as child care or maternity leave (Lovenduski, 1993: 7). The 
proportion of women (whether self-declared feminists or not) among the 
political elite is often lower in conservative than in social democratic parties. 
Thus within conservative political elites, there are less people who would pay 
attention to issues of interest for women.2 
Third, equality of opportunity and equality of outcome are present as aims 
to varying degrees in social democratic platforms. In contrast, when 
conservative parties pursue equality objectives, they tend to promote equality 
of opportunity. Thus socialist parties would in principle be more prone to 
establish policies in favor of disadvantaged groups of society, including 
affirmative action, in an attempt to achieve not only that people compete on the 
same terms but also that citizens obtain the same results (Lovenduski, Norris & 
Burness, 1994: 612; Squires, 1996: 75). The goal of some gender equality 
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policies is that women and men have the same access to material and cultural 
rewards, which is an objective directed to equality of results. 
Fourth, conservative parties usually defend that the state intervenes in the 
economy to a very limited extent, arguing that the free play of market forces is 
the only devise to achieve the best allocation of economic factors, high 
productivity and wealth. State intervention in society is not necessary either, 
since order and equilibrium in the economic sphere will translate into the social 
realm (Bosanquet, 1994; Gamble, 1986; Green, 1987; Krieger, 1986; Ruiz, 
1997). Thus conservative parties would favor that the state sets basic anti-
discriminatory guidelines, and allows the market and society to play freely. 
Fifth, conservative policy makers are at times interested in the promotion of 
a traditional agenda regarding both sexes (Abbott & Wallace, 1992; David, 
1986; Lovenduski, Norris & Burness, 1994: 611, 630-631). A mild variant of 
this agenda would emphasize that the family is the basic cell of the social 
fabric. Historically, the family has been the sphere where women dedicate more 
efforts than men. Some (or many) women may also want (or have to) work for 
wages. Nevertheless, society has to be organized in a way that permits women 
to fulfill their family and caring tasks. The main family function of most men 
(economic provision) and most women (the management of the intimate sphere 
in combination or not with bread-winning) are different but complementary 
and of equal worth for the development of society and its weakest members 
(children). Then, conservative governments would try to facilitate that women 
perform their family responsibilities. Conservative administrations would be 
less active making the labor market an equally attractive and rewarding place 
for women and men. 
Sixth, conservative parties are supposed to avoid policies that increase public 
spending. Ultimately, public spending is financed by detracting wealth from 
citizens. Conservatives defend that this wealth belong to individuals, and that 
it is better allocated when citizens spend it in the solution of their problems or 
the satisfaction of their needs in the market. Many (although not all) gender 
equality programmes are measures that increase authorities' spending, since 
these programmes impose extra costs to the state.3 
Studies on gender and politics have also acknowledged that conservative 
parties have at times responded to the demands of the women's movement 
(Byrne, 1996: 67; Lovenduski, 1993: 6-7, 13; 1996: 9; Lovenduski, Norris & 
Bums, 1994: 611-612; Skjeie, 1993). Thus conservative parties have to a 
limited extent converge towards socialist parties. Women within conservative 
parties have pressed claims to be fairly treated as party members, activists and 
leaders. Conservative parties have included women's issues in their agendas 
and made some efforts to present a higher number of female candidates in 
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elections. Once in office, conservative parties have been more willing than in 
the past to appoint women to governing positions, establish some gender 
equality policies (especially those that do not contradict the free market logic), 
and set up or maintain institutions with the explicit purpose of advancing 
women's rights and status (the so-called 'state feminist institutions' - Stetson 
& Mazur, 1995). Nevertheless, the general conclusion of most pieces of the 
literature on gender and politics defend that parties matter and that social 
democratic parties are much more active than conservative parties in search for 
gender equality. 
The comparative study of policy making by social democratic and 
conservative parties have been undertaken regarding other areas of public 
policy different than gender equality. This social science research has reached 
nuanced findings. To grasp the subtlety of these conclusions, it is useful to refer 
for instance to political economy studies. While many analyses of gender 
equality policy making tend to emphasize the differences between policy 
making by socialist and conservative governments, the conclusions of political 
economy research are more varied. Some of these studies have found mainly 
differences in economic policy making by socialist and conservative admini-
strations. Studying the industrial world since World War II, scholarly rf1search 
has argued that unemployment disproportionately affects workers, who iu"e the 
main electoral constituency of social democratic parties. When in power, these 
parties tend to promote anti-unemployment policies. In contrast, more affluent 
social groups and the business community are chiefly concerned with inflation. 
Since these people are the principal constituency of conservative parties, while 
in office these parties usually develop anti-inflation policies (Alt, 1985; Hibbs, 
1977, 1987a, b). 
Other political economy studies have documented more similarities than 
differences between economic policies established by socialist and con-
servative governments, or have identified differences that are not very 
significant (Hicks, 1984; Williams, 1990). Deep changes in industrial 
economies have taken place since the oil crises of the 1970s such as high 
mobility of capital flows, fixed rates, and a pronounced degree of openness of 
some national economies to international trade. These dimensions of an 
increasing economic interdependence at the international level substantially 
reduce the room for manoeuvering in economic policy making at the national 
level. Thus economic policies undertaken by social democratic administrations 
tend to converge towards those defended by conservative parties. Economic 
policy makers from both types of parties have pursued a similar objective (price 
stability) and have attempted to reduce the degree of intervention of the state 
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in the economy allowing market forces to play a bigger role (Moses, 1994; 
Notermans, 1993). 
Still, other studies of political economy have documented some differences 
in policy making between socialist and conservative parties but not other 
divergences. Analyzing countries of the Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development since the 1970s, Rueda (2000) found that social 
democratic parties have tended to be more active maintaining the employment 
protection of workers with protected jobs. Nevertheless, Rueda did not identify 
significant disparities among the two types of governments regarding anti-
inflation and anti-unemployment policies. On the other hand, it is commonly 
accepted that the globalization of the economy has produced the convergence 
of macroeconomic policies made by social democratic administrations towards 
those policies defended by conservative parties. Nevertheless, this has not been 
the case of supply-side economic policies. To increase fixed and human capital 
(factors of production), some socialist governments have extensively used the 
public sector, spending on infrastructure, education and, sometimes, creating or 
fostering a public business sector (Boix, 1998; Garrett & Lange, 1991). 
In sum, an important part (but nonetheless a part) of the literature on political 
economy documents a pronounced erosion of the differences in actual policy 
making by social democratic and conservative parties. This conclusion is in line 
with studies on party change which propose that in democracies the 
requirements of political competition put pressure on parties to look alike 
rather than diverge. Political parties tend to converge on the center of the 
ideological spectrum in order to win elections by capturing the median voter 
(Downs, 1957). Conversely, a relevant part of the literature on gender equality 
policy making tends to highlight differences between conservative and socialist 
parties in this area of public policy. Putting the two literatures together, one can 
ask: has convergence between the two parties also taken place regarding gender 
equality? If so, why? 
SELECTION OF THE EMPIRICAL CASE STUDY AND 
SOURCES 
This chapter attempts to contribute to the knowledge of gender equality policy 
making by socialist and conservative parties with an empirical study on child 
care policies developed by the central state in Spain under socialist 
administrations (1982-1996) and conservative governments (from 1996 to 
date). In principle, child care may benefit fathers and mothers. Nevertheless, 
given the division of labor between men and women within most families, child 
care usually affects the availability of mothers for paid work much more than 
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that of fathers (Randall, 1996: 178; Skjeie, 1993: 238). It can be argued that 
economic independence is a necessary ingredient for women's emancipation. 
Economic autonomy very often means participation in the labor market, since 
the majority of the population of active age acquires economic autonomy 
through paid work. Then, child care programmes can be considered a policy 
that promotes gender equality, since these services facilitate that mothers work 
for wages. 
According to Arend Lijphart (1971: 691), the best research design to study 
social reality is the comparison of two or more cases. Therefore, I compare 
policies elaborated by conservative and socialist administrations. Nevertheless, 
a single case may also be useful. The strength of a single case study 'is that by 
focusing on a single case, that case can be intensively examined even when the 
research resources at the investigator's disposal are relatively limited'. Then, I 
study only Spain, although the comparison of Spain with other national cases 
would be highly advisable for future research. In addition, a single case can be 
chosen if it is interesting in itself. Spain is a case in point to analyze policy 
making by conservative governments, because it is the only European Union 
(EU) member state (together with Austria) governed by a conservative party. In 
landmark pieces of research, Ruiz (1999a, b: 449) has convincingly argued that 
most analyses on gender and conservative administrations examine the United 
States and the United Kingdom, where conservative parties were in office in the 
1980s and early 1990s. Conclusions of research on these anglo-saxon 
conservative governments are then extended to other polities. This extension 
may be wrong, since conservative parties mayor may not be similar in different 
countries. Therefore, it is imperative to analyze conservative governments in 
countries different than the United States and the United Kingdom. 
It is important to note that in Spain, child care measures have been 
understood by policy makers mainly as a part of the education policy but not 
so much as a part of gender equality programmes (see below). In other 
countries some social and political actors (mainly feminists active in the 
women's movement, gender equality state institutions and trade unions) have 
advanced the demand for more extensive child care policies in order to help 
mothers to combine professional and family obligations. In Spain, the 
aforementioned three actors have scarcely advanced this demand (Valiente, 
1995: 254-259). Nevertheless, Spanish child care policies are an adequate 
empirical case to test hypotheses generated by the literature on political parties 
and gender equality measures. This is true for two reasons. Child care policies 
de facto influence the degree of equality or inequality between women and 
men, irrespectively of whether political parties consider child care a gender 
equality programme or not. On the other hand, the literature on gender and 
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politics to which this chapter refers is based on case studies on other countries 
different from Spain. Some of these case studies are on child care. 
The sources for this chapter include published government documents, 
legislative pieces, political party documents, press articles, secondary bibliog-
raphy, and personal interviews with social and political actors in the policy area 
of child care. 
CENTRAL STATE CHILD CARE POLICIES 
There have been mainly continuities in the policy area of child care at the 
central state level in the last two decades. Under both Socialist and 
Conservative governments parents have been receiving the following aid from 
the state for the care of children under six: a relatively generous supply of (free-
of-charge) public pre-school services for three-, four- and five-year-old 
children; hardly any public child care service for children aged two or under; 
and (up ti111999) low tax exemptions for child care expenses. 
In the last two decades, the main central state child care policy has been an 
ever increasing supply of public preschool programmes for children aged three 
or over administered chiefly by the Ministry of Education and Culture 
(Ministerio de Educaci6n y Cultura, MEC; before 1996, it was called the 
Ministry of Education and Science - Ministerio de Educaci6n y Ciencia). In 
academic year 1996-1997, the proportion of children who attended public 
preschool centers was: 70% of children aged 4 and 5, and 43% of those aged 
3. The scope of these programmes is quite high in comparative terms. Since the 
private sector also provides pre-school places, school attendance rates of 3, 4 
and 5 years old children are high in Spain in comparative terms (83%, 100%, 
and 100% respectively in academic year 1999-2000; provisional data). In 
contrast, the percentage of Spanish children aged 2 or under cared for in public 
centers (in academic year 1996-1997) is one of the lowest in the EU: 2.5%. 
The proportion of children aged 2 or under cared for in private centers is also 
very small: 3.5% - calculated by Celia Valiente from data contained in: 
Ministerio de Educaci6n y Cultura (1999: 79, 132-134); and data available on 
17 July 2000 at http://www.mec.es/estadistica/CifrasINAC_04.htrnl.4 
The absolute number and proportion of children who attend pre-school 
programmes in public centers has been increasing since 1975. While this type 
of center was attended by 347,026 children younger than 6 in academic year 
1975-1976, this figure was more than double (758,458 children) in academic 
year 1999-2000. Seen from another perspective, in academic year 1975-1976, 
above a third (38%) of children enrolled in pre-school education attended 
public centers. In academic year 1999-2000, this proportion was around 
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two/thirds (68%). The expansion of the supply of places in public child care 
centers has happened in a context of a reduction of the supply of child care in 
private centers. In academic year 1975-1976, the number of children enrolled 
in pre-school education who attended private centers was 573,310, while in 
academic year 1999-2000 the figure was 361,282 - calculated by Celia 
Valiente from data contained in: Instituto Nacional de Estadistica (1977: 
101-103; 1981: 12); and data available on 17 July 2000 at http://www.mec.es/ 
estadistica/CifrasINAS _0 l.html. 
Public pre-school programmes cannot be used by mothers (or parents) as 
perfect substitutes for child care, since pre-school hours are shorter than 
working hours (and sometimes much shorter and interrupted by a break). 
Similarly, pre-school holidays in public centers are much longer than working 
holidays. It is important to note that even if the percentage of women in 
employment is lower in Spain than in most EU member states, most Spanish 
women who work for wages have full-time jobs. In 1998, the Spanish female 
employment rate (35%) was the lowest in the EU, and much lower than the EU 
average (51 %).5 However, 83% of female workers worked on a full-time basis 
in Spain. This figure (together with that of Portugal and Finland) was the third 
highest in the EU, after that of Greece (89%) and Italy (86%), and sixteen 
points above the EU average (67%) (Franco, 1999: 8-9). 
Besides the pronounced expansion of the supply of public pre-school 
programmes, the other most important development in the policy area of child 
care under both socialist and conservative administrations has been territorial 
de-centralization. From the mid-1930s to 1975 Spain was governed by a right-
wing authoritarian regime headed by General Francisco Franco. During the 
Francoist dictatorship, the state was highly centralized. During the transition to 
democracy, a broad process of devolution of powers from the central state to 
the regions (not so much to localities) was set in motion. Since the early 1980s, 
some regional governments have been acquiring responsibilities which had 
previously belonged to the central state (for instance, education). The process 
of devolution of full responsibilities on education to all regions was completed 
in year 2000.6 
Other child care policies (such as state regulation of private centers, or tax 
exemptions for child care expenses) are much less important than the supply of 
preschool places in public centers. Regarding the regulation of private centers, 
the state established in 1990 that the minimum conditions required of public 
preschool centers (for instance, in terms of space per child or the number of 
children per carer) also apply to the private sector. Nevertheless, private centers 
opened before 1990 were given until year 2002 to adapt to this regulation. In 
contrast with other countries, paid care provided for children under six in 
Do Political Parties Matter? 105 
private homes (by babysitters, child-minders, etc.) is not regulated by the state 
in Spain (regarding, for instance, the qualifications of carers, the maximum 
number of children who can be cared for by a person, or the characteristics of 
the home where care is provided). 
With respect to tax reliefs, between 1991 and 1998, payers of the personal 
income tax could benefit from tax deductions for child care expenses (of the 
under-threes) of a maximum of 25,000 pesetas per year (around 93 Pounds 
Sterling) or the equivalent of 15% of the child care expenses. The income of the 
tax payer could not exceed a given level, and both parents had to work for 
wages outside the home. In fiscal year 1997 (corresponding to income 
generated in 1996), 116,371 tax payers benefitted from tax reliefs for child 
care. The average tax: deduction for each tax payer was 12,073 pesetas 
(approximately 45 Pounds Sterling) (Ministerio de Economia y Hacienda, 
Memoria de la Administraci6n Tributaria 1997, page 119; data from the whole 
Spain except the Basque country and Navarre; data available on 21 April 2000 
at http://www.meh.esIINSPGRALIMT97/cap2.pdf). 
In brief, since 1975, under governments of different ideological colors, a 
substantial extension of the supply of public pre-school programmes (the main 
child care policy) has happened in Spain. This expansion has occurred in a 
context of continuously diminishing fertility rates (the synthetic index of 
fertility in Spain continuously decreased from 2.79 in 1975 to 1.15 in 1998; the 
data of 1998 is provisional - European Commission, 1999: 102). The process 
of devolution of powers to the regions has also taken place under both social 
democratic and conservative administrations. Thus basic continuities have 
characterized child care policies in the last two decades. The Conservative 
party has introduced only minor modifications in the policy area of child care. 
The conservative government increased (modestly) tax exemptions for child 
care expenses in 1998, but abolished them altogether in 1999, in a general and 
substantial reform of the personal income tax system. 
SIMILAR POLICIES OF SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC AND 
CONSERVATIVE GOVERNMENTS: 
AN INTERPRETATION 
This section shows that until year 2000 child care policies promoted by the 
conservative party have been similar to those implemented by the socialist 
party for two reasons: strong electoral competition between both parties; and in 
the late 1990s the successful mobilization of left-wing parties and organiza-
tions of civil society in defense of the status quo in the policy area of child 
care. 
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Studying party positions is a complex and difficult but a feasible task (Mair, 
1999; Ramiro, 1999). Party points of view and commitments on specific issues 
are reflected in electoral programmes and in the resolutions of party 
congresses. Electoral programmes and resolutions of federal congresses of the 
social democratic party (Partido Socialista Obrero Espafio/, PSOE) contain the 
commitment to develop programmes for the under-sixes, conceptualized as 
educational policies (Partido Socialista Obrero Espafiol, 1979a: politic a 
sectorial 90, politica municipal 8; 1981: 91,277-279; 1982: 23-24; 1984: 66; 
1986: 61, 63; 1988: 44; 1989: 29-30; 1990: 109; 1993: 29; 1996: 51-53). 
PSOE documents also include some references to child care in the sections 
related to 'gender equality' (although far fewer than in the sections on 
'education') (Partido Socialista Obrero Espafiol, 1976: 19; 1979a: politic a 
sectorial 19-20; 1979b: 22; 1981: 233; 1982: 29; 1989: 66; 1990: 61, 109; 
1993: 59; 1996: 66-67; 2000: 17). 
In its electoral programmes and party congress resolutions, the PSOE had 
proposed that preschool programmes can be used as tools to achieve a higher 
degree of class equality. According to this view, children from underprivileged 
social classes should be enrolled in public preschool programmes. This 
enrollment would provide them with the educational skills necessary to be 
successful students in elementary school. This enrollment would also diminish 
the cultural differences that exist among children of different socio-economic 
backgrounds. All these ideas reflect the PSOE leaders' opinion that the 
educational system might work as an efficient mechanism against social 
inequalities (Partido Socialista Obrero Espafiol, 1979a: politic a sectorial 90, 
politica municipal 8; 1981: 91, 277-279; 1982: 23-24; 1984: 66; 1986: 61, 63; 
1988:44; 1989: 29-30; 1990: 109; 1993: 29; 1996:51-53). 
While in office, the socialist party significantly increased the supply of 
places in public centers, in order to reverse the past trend of unequal access to 
pre-school educational services. In the 1970s and 1980s educational services 
for the under-sixes were mainly provided by the private sector. Therefore, 
chiefly families who could afford to pay the fees charged by private centers 
provided their children with preschool education. Proportionally less families 
from more modest socio-economic strata enrolled their children in these 
centers (De Puelles, 1986: 448-449; Gonzalez-Anleo, 1985: 74; Medina, 1976: 
123; Mufioz-Repiso et al., 1992: 21-22). 
If preschool programmes are defined as an education service for pupils, one 
might ask: at what age should children start to attend education centers? 
Historically this age was fixed around 6 years (De Puelles, 1986: 447-448). 
Three decades ago, this age was supposed to be 4 or 5 years (Instituto de la 
Mujer, 1990; Medina, 1976: 115). Now, numerous political and social actors 
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have agreed with the view that this age is approximately 3 years. In practice, 
this idea has been reflected in the provision of numerous places in public 
centers for children aged 3 or over, and hardly any for the under-threes. 
Significant sectors of the popUlation have also agreed with these views about 
the advantages of the preschool experiences described above and the age at 
which children should start attending preschool activities (Instituto de la Mujer, 
1990: 50-54; McNair, 1984: 41-42). 
This is the background against which conservative policy makers had to 
clarify their positions in the area of child care while in opposition and promote 
policies while in office (since June 1996). In its electoral programmes, the 
conservative party (under the names of Alianza Popular, Coalicion Democra-
tica, Coalicion Popular and Partido Popular, PP, the last one, the PP, being 
used in the rest of the chapter) has also understood preschool programmes 
chiefly as education policies (Alianza Popular, 1977: 31; 1982: 104-105; 
Coalici6n Democnitica, 1979: 45; Coalici6n Popular, 1986: 9; Partido Popular, 
1989: 10; 1993: 56-58; 1996: 98-99; 2000: 29), and to a much lesser extent as 
gender equality measures, and/or family policies (Coalici6n Democnitica, 
1979: 37; Alianza Popular, 1982: 135; Partido Popular, 1989: 29; 1993: 81; 
1996: 181-182,187-189; 2000: 18,58). 
Ruiz (1999a, b) has persuasively argued that it is reasonable to defend that 
since the late 1980s the conservative party changed its discourses regarding 
women's issues due to strong electoral competition against the PSOE. In the 
same line, I now defend that possibly the conservative party also changed its 
discourses on some topics related to social class (such as child care) while 
electorally competing with the socialist party. Moreover, once in office, the 
conservative party promoted public policy in line with these modified 
discourses. 
In the 1970s and 1980s, the conservative party was identified by an 
important sector of the electorate as a party which defended the interests of 
affluent citizens (Montero, 1988: 154-157). This identification was extremely 
negative, since it impeded the PP to win the majority of the vote. After loosing 
several elections, the conservative party started to change its discourse 
regarding child care. It is an issue that the population and the political class 
could perceive as related to socio-economic inequalities. The PP electoral 
programmes between 1977 and 1986 insistently argued in favor of the private 
sector as provider of child care services. This idea was presented in terms of the 
freedom of families to choose the type of center that they prefer for their 
children (Alianza Popular, 1977: 31; 1982: 103-104; Coalici6n Democnitica, 
1979: 45-46; Coalici6n Popular, 1986: 8-10). This discourse resembles the 
discourses of conservative parties in other countries, for instance, that of the 
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United Kingdom (Peele, 1988: 27-28; Randall, 1996: 181-183,190). However, 
since the 1989 electoral programme, the pp softened its pro-private sector 
position. Paragraphs on the matter started to appear less frequently in PP's 
electoral programmes. Electoral platforms began to contain (very few) lines on 
the importance of the public sector and the need to erode socio-economic 
inequalities in the access to education. The PP also committed itself to increase 
the quality of public education if in government (Partido Popular, 1989: 10--12; 
1993: 56-58; 1996: 96-98; 2000, 28). Thus in the last decade there has been 
a convergence of positions by the PP and the PSOE (as reflected in electoral 
programmes) regarding education. 
However, in spite of the aforementioned alteration of the discourse in PP 
electoral programmes since the late 1980s, in year 2000 the PP's position in 
education is still different from that of the PSOE. Generally speaking, PSOE 
electoral programmes have traditionally defended that the state should be the 
major actor in education, while the PP still defends (although less insistently 
than in the past) that the state has to play a subsidiary role in this policy area. 
PSOE programmes continuously refer to equality among social classes as an 
objective in the policy area of education, while PP programmes emphasize the 
freedom of individuals and organizations to set up education centers, and the 
freedom of parents to choose education centers for their children in a scenario 
of plural supply. Depending on the election, PP programmes also defend that 
the state provides generous subsidies to private child care centers and/or to 
families. 
Since the conservative party reached government (June 1996), the socialist 
party, the electoral coalition the United Left (lzquierda Unida ideologically to 
the Left of the PSOE and the third electoral force in most national elections) 
and organizations of civil society (mainly associations of parents of pupils who 
attend public education centers, unions of teachers and workers of public 
centers, and students' organizations) have carefully watched governmental 
actions in the policy area of education. These left-wing parties and associations 
have mobilized endlessly against any governmental move in the direction of 
curtailing the public sector and fostering the private sector as provider of child 
care services, attempts to increase the tiny subsidies to private centers or to 
families who send their children there, and diminish the number of pre-school 
public places or public expenditure on public child care services. This 
mobilization by the left-wing parties and voluntary organizations has been 
amply covered by some mass media including El Pais, which is the main 
national newspaper.7 Mobilizations in defense of the preservation of parts of the 
welfare state have also taken place in other areas of social policy (Guillen & 
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Matsaganis, 2000). This visible mobilization probably prevented that the pp 
elaborated more policies in favor of private child care provision. 
CONCLUSION 
Contrary to the predictions of an important part of the literature on political 
parties and gender equality policy, in Spain the conservative party in power 
since June 1996 has promoted central state child care policies similar to those 
put in place by previous socialist governments. In the last two decades the main 
child care policy has been the increasing supply of pre-school services in public 
centers for children aged 3 to 6. Possibly, this continuity in policy making can 
be explained in terms of the strong electoral competition between the socialist 
and the conservative parties and the successful mobilization of left-wing parties 
and organizations of civic society in favor of the preservation of the policies 
established before 1996. 
This chapter confirms the conclusions reached by Ruiz (1999a, b) while 
studying the position of the Spanish conservative party regarding women's 
issues. Ruiz demonstrated that the ideas defended by the conservative party 
converged towards the position of the socialist party, probably because the 
conservative party is an electorally motivated party, which in the late 1980s 
attempted to convert itself into a catch-all party to reach power. Contrary to the 
conservative parties of the United Kingdom and the United States in office in 
the 1980s and early 1990s, the Spanish conservative party moderated its 
traditional views on women's roles. This chapter shows that since the late 
1980s the Spanish conservative party has softened its defense of the private 
sector as the provider of education in general and pre-school programmes in 
particular. While Ruiz exhaustively analyzed party positions, this chapter also 
studies actual policy making. Once in power, the conservative party acted in 
accordance with the aforementioned renewed ideas in the policy area of child 
care. 
From the conclusions of research made by Ruiz and this chapter, one can 
infer that more research is needed on electoral competition as a causal factor of 
changes in party positions and actual policy making. In the late 1980s the 
Spanish conservative party had lost several elections and started to modify its 
points of view in order to reach government. However, it is still unknown how 
the conservative party decided that the positions to be changed were those 
related to women's roles and child care (among others). Nor is it known which 
concrete mechanisms made possible the change in party positions (for instance, 
a modification of the party leadership, or the necessity to comply with the 
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requirements of membership of supra-national institutions such as the 
European Union). 
It is important to note that the socialist party was in power for fourteen years, 
while by the time of this writing the conservative party has been in office for 
four years. Thus the policy continuity regarding child care has to be interpreted 
with caution. This policy continuity may be a signal that party politics did not 
really matter in this policy area. Alternatively, it can be defended that the 
socialist party had been in power for a period long enough to set the agenda in 
government with respect to child care. Social democrats were able to set targets 
and values in government departments and civil service, and this remains in 
place despite a new and ideological different party arriving into power. 
Since 1996, the Spanish conservative party continued to develop a part of the 
education policy (child care programmes) along the same lines of its 
predecessor in government, the socialist party. This policy continuity raises 
new questions. Why the socialist governments did not emphasize more the 
dimension of gender equality policy of child care programmes? Had the 
socialist party emphasized more the gender dimension of child care, would the 
conservative party have encountered more difficulties maintaining social 
democratic child care policies? These new questions go beyond the scope of 
this chapter but would require further research. 
The policy continuity in the area of child care under socialist and 
conservative governments leads us to the question of policy innovation and 
preservation. Social democratic governments significantly expanded the supply 
of pre-school places in public centers and devolved education responsibilities 
to the regions. The conservative government preserved existing policies 
established by precedent administrations. Research in other measures different 
than child care may perhaps confirm that socialist governments innovate in the 
policy area of gender equality while conservative administrations maintain 
what is already in place without innovating further. Perhaps dismantling 
existing programmes requires too high an electoral cost for any party to pay. 
Conservative parties are very different among each other. While some 
promote very traditional agendas regarding gender roles, others do not. 
Generally speaking, left-wing parties were historically the first to incorporate 
gender equality objectives in their platforms and actual policy making partly 
due to successful feminist activism within these parties. Afterwards, some 
conservative parties (in some cases with considerable delay) have followed suit 
preserving policies initiated by social democrats while others have not. More 
research is needed in the future in order to understand which conservative 
parties have converged towards social democratic positions, regarding which 
issues, and under what circumstances. 
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NOTES 
1. In this chapter, the expressions 'social democratic' and 'socialist' are used as 
synonymous. The same applies to 'government/s' and 'administration/s'. 
2. This argument has to be taken with caution, since the proportion of female 
members in conservative parties is usually higher than in socialist parties. Conservative 
female members can put pressure on activists and leaders of their party to include 
women's issues among their priorities. Nevertheless, it is not always the case that this 
pressure is exercised and that activists and leaders of (all) political parties know and 
bear in mind the demands of the rank-and-file. 
3. It is important to note that economic costs are not the only or the most important 
costs that may preclude conservative parties from establishing gender equality policies. 
Perhaps the most costly policies for these parties are those which include not economic 
but ideological costs, such as the regulation of abortion or divorce, because of the moral 
and religious connotations of these issues. 
4. For pre-school attendance rates in Spain and other industrial countries see: 
European Commission (1998: 76); and Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (2000: 135). 
5. The female employment rate is the proportion of employed women out of the 
female population of working age. 
6. As a result of the process of devolution, programmes formulated by the MEC have 
affected a decreasing number of regions. Then, the data provided in this chapter for the 
1990s (for example, the percentage of children younger than six who attended public 
pre-school programmes) are the result of public policies elaborated by the central state 
and regional governments with responsibility on education. 
7. In order to document the coverage of this mobilization, I have exhaustively 
examined the daily edition of El Pais since June 1996 up to the writing of this chapter 
(Summer 2(00). 
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